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Abstract: Environmental Ethics is a type of applied ethic whose objec-
tive is to guide, using principles and rules, the analysis, the deliberation, 
and the resolution of conflicts that are environmental and social at the 
same time. Within the different theoretical approaches of Environmental 
Ethics, there is a tension between normative ethical level and the meth-
odological level that prevents integration between the two of them. The 
problem of Environmental Ethics to reconcile these two orders is the 
issue addressed in this paper. Our proposal regarding this subject is to 
approach it from a theoretical strategy of mid-level principles and this is 
why it does not aim at suggesting a theoretical foundation of ethics, but 
a referential framework that makes a pluralistic outline of principles 
compatible with a well-defined methodology of rules and meta-rules, thus 
contributing to a more practical Environmental Ethics. 
Keywords: environmental ethics, socio-environmental conflicts, mid-
level principles, framework principle, derivative principles, strategic 
principles, environmental citizenship.
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1. INTRODUCTION
We start from the premise that Environmental Ethics (EE) is a type 
of applied ethics whose objective is to guide, using principles and rules, 
the analysis, the deliberation, and the resolution of conflicts that are en-
vironmental and social. With this purpose, two aspects of a different 
order must be made compatible: the normative ethical level and the 
methodological level. Within the theoretical approaches of EE there is a 
tension in these levels that ultimately prevents integration between them.
The normative ethics order refers to the compatibility between the 
duties of justice toward current and future human beings and the duties 
of caring for the environment and the non-human living entities. The 
methodological order aims to make the principles that justify those duties 
and with the method that allows them to be applied compatible. The 
difficulty of EE to reconcile these two orders is the problem addressed in 
this paper. 
Our proposal regarding this subject is approaching it from a theoreti-
cal strategy of mid-level principles. In addition, because of this, it does 
not aim at suggesting a theoretical foundation of ethics, but a referential 
framework that makes a pluralistic outline of principles compatible with 
a well-defined methodology of rules and meta-rules, thus contributing to 
make a more practical EE. 
The socio-environmental conflicts are expressions of the metabolic 
maladjustment that exists between the social systems and the ecosystems 
at different levels: global, regional, national and local. This maladjustment 
impacts on current and future generations of humans and on other species 
and ecosystems. Within this context, different societies at a global level 
engage in the usage of natural resources and in the burdens of pollution 
they produce in an unequal manner, which brings about ecological dis-
tribution conflicts (Martínez Alier, 2002). 
This kind of conflicts are classified in different categories, depending 
on the type of environmental impact: (i) Conflicts in the extraction of 
materials and energy: conflicts over oil extraction, use of water, mining, 
biopiracy and conflicts between traditional and industrial fisheries. 
(ii) Conflicts about transportation: oil spills, conflicts over oil and gas 
pipelines, tailings, etc. (iii) Conflicts about waste and pollution: toxic 
struggles, export of toxic, solid or liquid wastes, transboundary pol-
lution, equal rights to carbon sinks, amongst others (Martínez Alier, 
2006).
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The socio-environmental issues have certain characteristics that are 
relevant for an ethical analysis and that differentiate EE from other ap-
plied ethics. (i) They are caused by anonymous collective action or by 
private actors or state agents. (ii) They demand a technical and scientific 
knowledge that originates from a number of different disciplines. (iii) 
There is a constant scientific uncertainty regarding their long-term impact. 
(iv) They are extremely dynamic. (v) They are inter-connected with 
other socio-environmental problems; therefore, they need to be addressed 
in a holistic manner. Furthermore, these problems need to be expressed 
in different “languages of valuation” (Martínez Alier, 2002). The use of 
a monetary language (‘the internalization of externalities’ in the price 
system, or the ‘polluter pays principle’, or ‘cost–benefit’ analysis.) is not 
enough because there are also environmental, social, cultural, and recrea-
tional considerations, whose appropriate names are livelihood, food se-
curity, human rights, territorial rights or other.
The questions that arise from this type of problems are: (i) What 
principles of environmental ethics are necessary to give coherence to a 
pluralistic ethical framework and, at the same time, feasibility to a 
problem-solving methodology of socio-environmental conflicts? (ii) Why 
would those principles be chosen over others? How do you justify that 
choice? (iii) How to specify the principles in rules, at the time of ap-
plication, and how to weigh the rules when they conflict in a concrete 
case? (iv) Finally, one has to ask if a principles strategy is enough to build 
an EE.
2.  THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND THE METHODOLOGICAL 
BOUNDARIES OF ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS
Throughout the EE tradition, which was born around the 1970s, 
alongside with other applied ethics, a double tension is observed in both 
of the aspects identified in the problem just stated, normative ethics level 
and the methodology level, which ends up by revealing the lack of inte-
gration between both (Lecaros 2012, 2013a, 2013b). 
At the level of normative ethics, EE must reconcile the duties towards 
human beings with the duties towards the environment. The tension 
between both duties is expressed, on the one hand, in each of the EE 
founding approaches (anthropocentrism, biocentrism and ecocentrism) 
and, on the other hand, between these approaches. This dual tension rests 
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on a meta-ethical question to which class of entities belongs the intrinsic 
value that underlies socio-environmental ethical duties (current or future 
human beings, or sentient animals, all living things, ecosystems, or even 
the biosphere).
Each approach proposes normative ethic answers that are incompat-
ible to each other and create tension of the foundation of each one. On 
one side, the ethical anthropocentrism has difficulties for justifying its 
duties towards nature, when these duties are not or cannot be mediated 
by current or future human interests. On the other side, biocentrism and 
ecocentrism have trouble establishing priority criteria when there is 
conflict between the environmental duties and social justice duties, and 
current or future human beings. 
At a methodological level, EE must reconcile the principles with their 
methods of application. Both the founding approaches and the socio-
environmental ones have failed to build a harmonic proposal that links 
the principles to the method. The founding approaches, which focus on 
arguing meta-ethical and normative ethic issues, leave aside the moment 
of applying the theory. The second one, however, is concerned with 
answering concrete socio-environmental issues, from their starting point 
of criticism theory (Anarchism, Marxism or Feminism, amongst others), 
which leave their theoretical presuppositions devoid of a mediation be-
tween the principles and the problem-solving rules. 
The double tension here is manifested, on the one side, between the 
methodological proposals of the founding approaches, which are not 
compatible with themselves (anthropocentrism and non-anthropocen-
trism) and, on the other side, between themselves and the socio-environ-
mental approaches (Social Ecology, Eco-Marxism, Environmentalism 
of the Poor, Environmental Justice, Ecofeminism), which react to the 
abstract character of the first one. Ultimately, both the founding and 
the socio-environmental approach, sustain, to more or less extent, a di-
vorce between the moment of justification (why) and the moment of 
application (how).
Specialized literature has highlighted with different emphasis this 
diagnosis (Nash, 1989; Norton, 1991, 2003; Shrader-Frechette, 1991, 
2002; Riechmann, 2006; Weston, 2009). However, the direct treatment 
of the problem is still, in our view, unsystematic. As a proof of this, all 
we have to do is to point out that in the monumental work Encyclope-
dia of Environmental Ethics and Philosophy (Callicot & Frodeman, 
eds., 2008) there is not entry about the EE methodological issue, and is 
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still expecting an entry regarding Environmental Conflict Resolution, 
which is more of a technical mechanism and has no relation with a 
particular ethical theory. 
The divorce between the moment of justification and the moment of 
application of EE follows different types of biases, which we can group 
in five different categories: (i) the epistemic bias is the one related to the 
gap that exists between the use of risk assessment techniques, environ-
mental analysis techniques and the economic epistemology that underlays 
the discussions (Sagoff 1988, Shrader-Frechette 1991); (ii) the meta-
ethical bias that embraces issues such as the difference of position between 
ethical intuitionism and non-intuitionism, the existence or the absence of 
an intrinsic value in nature, and whether they exist objectively or they 
are created by humans, among other topics (Jamieson 2008); (iii) the 
normative bias is mainly related to the differences between the ethical 
theories regarding the extension of the environment-related duties (only 
regarding future human beings, or regarding sentient animals, or regard-
ing everything that is alive, or even regarding the ecosystems, biosphere); 
(iv) the estimative bias refers to the tension between the positions that 
tend towards the axiological dichotomy and those that are open to an 
axiological pluralism; (v) the aesthetic and imaginative bias has to do 
with the differences that surround the aesthetic value (an extrinsic value) 
that is bestowed upon nature in its natural state and the heuristic value 
given to the human ability to imagine socio-environmental scenarios that 
are different from the ones we currently have. 
To overcome this theoretical and methodological weakness, we will 
take the evolution of another applied ethic, Bioethics, as a point of refer-
ence. Bioethics was born around the same period as EE, and it has devel-
oped theoretical and methodological integrated frameworks that have 
successfully solved problems in the biomedicine field, sciences of life and 
their technological implementations. The extensive bioethical literature 
shows the profound debate that has surrounded the methodological issues 
when it comes to solving moral conflicts in specific contexts such as the 
clinical and the medical research. 
To a large extent, this debate was promoted by the success of Beau-
champ and Childress’ theoretical and methodological proposal in Princi-
ples of Biomedical Ethics (1979, latest edition 2013). The North 
American authors proposed a cluster of moral principles, which serve as 
guidelines to determine more specific moral norms to solve problems. 
Using the concept of “cluster” they are trying to show that each princi-
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ple is an integrating focal point for other principles and moral considera-
tions. Besides the principles and rules, the authors do not disregard the 
importance of the rights and virtues in the conflicts that arise in moral 
life (Beauchamp & Childress 2013, 13-14).
For the purpose of our proposal, what we would like to highlight is 
that these authors were not trying to substantiate the principles in any 
particular normative ethics theory (kantian, utilitarian, casuistry, virtue 
ethics, etc.). Because of this, they have been denominated mid-level prin-
ciples for they prove compatible with “many or perhaps most of ethical 
theories” (Beauchamp & Childress 2013, 383-384). Justifying that Prin-
ciples of Biomedical Ethics does not form a normative ethical theory, 
and so it is not the subject of this article. The authors emphasise the way 
in which they choose to justify their principles and, with such purpose, 
they resort to a procedural or formal theoretical justification and an-
other one that is substantive, while respectively following the model of 
“reflective equilibrium” (Rawls, 1971, 1999) and the common morality 
theory (Gert, 1998; Gert, Culver & Clouser, 2006).
The criticisms this proposal received were not enough to undermine 
it, on the contrary, they have allowed it to grow. These criticisms come 
from different perspectives, such as the common morality theory (Clous-
er & Gert, 1990; Gert, Culver & Clouser, 2006), casuistry (Jonsen, 
1995; Strong, 2000), communitarianism (Callahan, 2003), hermeneutic 
ethics (Ten Have, 1994), amongst others. They have hugely enriched the 
ideas that have been suggested to determine the methodological extent of 
bioethics and, at the same time, to specify the content of the principles. 
This has been reflected in the maturity and success that the discipline has 
been awarded by society through its institutionalization in different ways, 
such as ethical committees, national and international commissions, rec-
ommendations and reports to international agencies, etc. 
In this paper we use the theoretical model of mid-level principles 
proposed by Beauchamp and Childress merely as a guideline to design a 
strategy to create a scheme of principles in EE. From our perspective, it 
is a good model to face the problems we identified, because the logic of 
structure and explanation of the Beauchamp and Childress’ theory is 
conceived in a way that is right to coordinate the level of the principles 
(the theory) with the level of rules and their application procedure through 
the use of the deliberative method, specification, weigh and balance. 
However, it is important to clarify that we do not use this model either 
because of the four clusters of moral principles structure that the authors 
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propose (autonomy, beneficence, non-malfeasance and justice), or for the 
specific content of any of the rules that result from these principles. We 
use it as a model so that we can follow its architecture and internal logic, 
which we consider suitable to design a scheme of EE principles that 
will be able to solve problems and conflicts of a socio-environmental 
order. 
3. PROPOSAL OF PRINCIPLES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS
The design we propose as a scheme of principles for EE is character-
ized by a three-level structure that docs not mean a hierarchy of principles 
in terms of an “ultimate foundation” in a specific EE theory, be it an-
thropocentric, biocentric or ecocentric. In this sense, our proposal, while 
following the Principlism’ model, would serve to build a mid-level prin-
ciples’ theory that is compatible with anthropocentric and non-anthro-
pocentric theories alongside with theories that have a socio-environmen-
tal approach. 
The first level of the proposal is composed by a framework principle: 
the principle of responsibility as caring for the vulnerable being, which 
allows us to combine a weak anthropocentrism with a moderate biocen-
trism. 
The second level is built by three principles derived from the frame-
work principle, which make them compatible with the duties towards 
current and future human beings, non-human living creatures and the 
environment: (i) the principle of intragenerational global justice; (ii) the 
principle of intergenerational justice (future generations); and (iii) the 
principle of interspecific care or principle of caring for life in the biosphere. 
These three principles represent a cluster of principles of intermediate 
level that comprehends other principles and norms of a strategic and 
operational level. 
The third level is built over a foundation of four principles of opera-
tional order that aim at safeguarding the balance and integrity of the deri-
vational principles through specific norms that need to be weighed and 
balanced when they conflict. These strategic principles are: (i) the principle 
of sustainability; (ii) the precautionary principle; (iii) the principle of com-
mon but differentiated responsibility; and (iv) the polluter-pays principle.
To justify the election of the principles Beauchamp and Childress fol-
low the Rawls’s model of reflective equilibrium (Rawls 1970, 1999) and 
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the common morality theory (Gert 1998; Gert, Culver and Clouser 
2006). For our proposal, the usefulness of the method of reflective equi-
librium lies on the fact that it allows that our scheme can be constantly 
reviewed. This method aims at searching, through an analysis and con-
tinuous adjustment, the harmony or coherence between our moral 
convictions, in which we have placed our upmost trust and we believe to 
be less influenced by biases and prejudices (considered moral judgements), 
and the moral principles and theoretical tenets they uphold. 
The usefulness of the common morality theory in elaborating a 
scheme of principles for the EE is found in the ability to recognize those 
general principles (i. e. intergenerational justice, precautionary, solidar-
ity), adopted by the moral judgment that most people support and share 
in society. However, the conflict of principles is not solved by the 
common morality theory, since it still works at an abstract and formal 
level. The conflict of the principles does not work at an abstract level, 
but, at the moment of its application to a particular case, by means of 
the specification of a principle in rules. Different approaches in EE can 
converge in the formal recognition of the same value as the basis of a 
principle, but they differ in content or meaning when applied to spe-
cific cases. Therefore, at the abstract level of the principles there is only 
an apparent agreement. For this reason, a methodological framework 
in the EE is necessary to weigh and balance such axiological tensions 
that underlie the principles.
This proposal recognizes that, when applying principles and rules, a 
methodology of weighing and balancing the norms that are in conflict is 
not enough, for there are other referential frameworks to consider when 
evaluating the interests of the affected parties: the language of rights and 
the language of the virtuous agent. Because of this, we have added the 
approach of an environmental citizenship for a sustainable society to this 
proposal. 
Our proposal does not intend to develop a theory of the action of the 
moral agent in socio-environmental conflicts. We do not doubt the crucial 
importance of the above, but the objective of the article is to give an ac-
count of the need to establish coherence between the plurality of ethical 
principles at stake in the EE and their application. The proposal of the 
authors is that the principles cannot be applied directly, without mediat-
ing procedures specification, weighting and balance. For this reason, a 
reflective rational agent in needed when assuming responsibility for the 
environment.
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3.1 FRAMEWORK PRINCIPLE
The principle of responsibility as caring for the vulnerable beings comes 
from Hans Jonas’ (1979) ethics; however, this does not mean that we 
accept his metaphysical foundation. On the contrary, it is arguable that 
this principle does not need an ultimate justification but a proof of its 
evidence in the proto-factuality of the phenomenon of life, which is, in 
essence, what is vulnerable. 
The principle performs a double meaning within the design of the 
proposal: (i) an indicative function, for it allows us to outline the basic 
aspects of EE and to establish, in a coherent manner, an ethics that is 
concerned with vulnerable people (global ethics), with the vulnerability 
of future human beings (future generations ethics) and with the vulner-
ability of life expressed in live entities and the systemic relations (animal 
and environmental ethics); (ii) a justifying function, for it allows us to 
uphold derivative and strategic principles when the justification through 
abstract procedures (reflective equilibrium) is no longer enough, because 
it ends up in intuitions rooted in the common morality and are inherent 
in the world of life. This principle has to be considered a framework 
principle for the principles that follow and not an ultimate foundation 
for them. 
3.2. DERIVATIVE PRINCIPLES
Derivative principles are interdependent principles that enable us to 
integrate the duties of justice towards current and future human beings 
to the duties towards the environment. The structure of the derivative 
principles is as follows:
A. Principle of Intragenerational Justice or economic and environ-
mental global justice. This principle upholds a global ethic of the 
fair distributions of natural resources and/or respect for the mini-
mum rights of livelihood (Singer 2002; Shrader-Frechette 2002; 
Sachs & Santarius 2007), which is linked to sustainable growth 
(vid.infra). 
B. Principle of Intergenerational Justice (future generations). This 
principle upholds the rules of comparable option quality of the 
environment and of access to the legacy of future human beings 
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(Brown 1999; Dobson 1999). Under this principle, it is possible 
to discuss the different positions that the justice theories undertake 
in relation with the interests of future human beings in the design 
of the social contract (libertarian, liberal and communitarian theo-
ries). 
C. Principle of Interspecific Care or principle of taking care of life in 
the biosphere. This principle upholds the duties related to animal 
care and the duties towards the environment over the basis of 
recognizing the intrinsic basic value of living entities, which is used 
as a starting point to build derivative values (species) and projective 
values (ecosystem, biodiversity, biosphere). Within this context, 
the key issue is to discuss the extension of the moral community 
and the theories of interest prioritization in conflictive cases (Good-
paster 1978; Sterba 1998; Attfiled 1995).
3.3. STRATEGIC PRINCIPLES 
Strategic principles are non-prioritized and intermediate level princi-
ples. In this sense, they imply prima facie duties, which means that eve-
ryone has to be respected unless it conflicts with a duty of the same or of 
superior level. The roles of these principles is to guarantee the integrity 
and interdependence of the derivative principles. The structure and con-
tent of the strategic principles is as follows:
A. Principle of sustainability. This principle is at the basis of the con-
cept of sustainable growth, which has three dimensions. The first 
one is the dimension of future, which is the better-known one 
thanks to the Brundtlland Report Our Common Future (1985): 
sustainable growth is that which satisfies “the needs of the current 
generation without compromising the ability of future generations 
to satisfy their own needs”. This concept of sustainability correlates 
with the idea of limits to growth (Meadows 1972, 1992). The 
second dimension is the one present in the idea of metabolic adjust-
ment between society and nature, in whose description and analy-
sis intervenes the environmental economics (Georgescu Roegen 
1971; Daly 2004), human ecology, whose most powerful tool is 
the ecological footprint (Wackernagel & Ress 1992), and other 
tools of the Environmental Governance (Saunier & Meganck 2007; 
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Bäckstrand et al. 2010; Bäckstrand & Kronsell 2015). The third 
dimension is the self– sufficiency or austerity in view of the need 
to go beyond eco-efficiency (Weizsäcker et al. 1997), restricted by 
the rebound effect or Jevons paradox, and encouraging self-suffi-
ciency policies (Linz et al. 2007). 
 There are four recurring elements in the definitions of sustainable 
growth that shape this concept within the International Environ-
mental Law: (i) intergenerational equity: the need to preserve 
natural resources for the benefit of future generations (Principle 3 
of the Rio Declaration). (ii) Sustainable use of resources: exploiting 
natural resources in a “sustainable”, “cautious”, “rational” or “ap-
propriate” manner. (iii) Intragenerational fair or equitable use: the 
state-wide use of resources has to bear in mind the necessity of 
other states. This element is mainly represented in the recognition 
of the special needs of the developing countries. (iv) Integration 
element: the need to assure that the environmental needs will be 
integrated in economic and development plans, programs and 
projects, and that developmental needs will be taken into account 
when applying environmental objectives (Principle 4 of the Rio 
Declaration).
B. Precautionary Principle. This principle commands that when hu-
man activities can lead to (i) risk of unacceptable damage (those 
which threaten life or human health or the environment, which 
are severe and indeed irreversible, and unfair for current or future 
generations), (ii) that are scientifically plausible but uncertain (the 
plausibility judgement has to be based on a scientific analysis and 
the uncertainty is applied, although not limited to, to causality or 
the limits of the hypothetical damage), (iii) measures or actions 
need to be taken that avoid or reduce the risk of damage (actions 
or measures need to prevent the risk of damage, they need to be 
proportional to the severity of the damage, the have to assess the 
consequences of both the action and the inaction, which have to 
be chosen in an inclusive manner). It is maybe one of the most 
controversial concepts and tools of the environmental governance 
and, because of this, in the systematization and clarification of the 
debate, there needs to be a distinction between the legal argument 
(Ewald et al. 2008; De Sadeleer 2007) and the ethical one (Raffensper-
ger & Tickner 1999). In the International Environmental Law, 
the criteria or precautionary principle has different demonstrations 
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with very different normative contents. First, the risk standard of 
proof (in other words, the degree of risk that triggers the principle) 
is not consistent: sometimes you need risk of serious or irreparable 
damage, while in other cases the risk of environmental damage is 
enough, without a major qualification. Second, it varies depending 
on the burden of proof. Third, the expected response varies once 
the principle has been applied: (i) it can force into action; (ii) it can 
empower to act; or (iii) just promote more caution.
C. Principle of common but differentiated responsibility. This princi-
ple was introduced in the Declaration of Rio and has been widely 
discussed at an international level for the implementation of the 
Convention on Climate Change and it is present in the specialized 
literature of Global Environmental Politics (Hoffmann, 2011; 
Dauvergne, 2012). This principle, just as it is stated in the Declara-
tion, assumes that there has been a group of countries who are 
mainly responsible of the planets’ environmental issues, and that, 
to a large extent, they owe to that exploitation the development 
they possess today. As a consequence, this principle, even though 
it recognizes the necessity for commitment by all countries while 
facing environmental issues, makes a distinction between developed 
and developing countries, while applying the idea of intergenera-
tional justice or equity. 
 Even though we are talking about the obligation to cooperate in 
the development of specific norms, there is a significant normative 
value in setting parameters according to which there needs to be 
a distribution of the responsibility amongst the developed and 
developing countries, and this has to be taken into account in the 
following treatises or the interpretation of those in effect. The 
shared but differentiated responsibility, in consequence, can sig-
nify the definition of an equitable balance between the developed 
and developing countries, at least in two ways: (i) it enables dif-
ferent standards for developing countries and (ii) makes supportive 
assistance demandable from the developing countries to developed 
ones. Differentiated responsibility means that there has to be more 
demanding conduct standards for developed countries, for they 
are the ones who have contributed the most to the current envi-
ronmental issue (such as exhaustion of the ozone layer and climate 
change) and are the ones who, in turn, have the greatest capacity 
to face them. 
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 Polluter-pays principle. This principle contends that the costs of 
pollution have to be assumed by the one responsible for causing it. 
However, the precise content or signification of this principle, 
alongside with its application to particular situations, is still to be 
determined, particularly in relation with nature and the extent of 
the costs and of the exceptional circumstances in which the princi-
ple would not be applicable. The Declaration of Rio acknowl-
edges this principle as follows: “Principle 16. National authorities 
should endeavour to promote the internalization of environmental 
costs and the use of economic instruments, taking into account the 
approach that the polluter should, in principle, bear the cost of 
pollution, with due regard to the public interest and without dis-
torting international trade and investment.” The practical implica-
tions of this principle is shown in the allocation of economic obli-
gations to those activities that damage the environment, particu-
larly through the use of economics tools (insurances and objective 
liability) and the implementation of the norms that refer to com-
petence and subsidies (for example, to discourage the use of tech-
nologies or unsafe practices). 
3.4  ENVIRONMENTAL CITIZENSHIP AS RESPONSIBLE AGENT  
IN THE GLOBAL SOCIETY
A proposal of EE principles that does not take into account the agent 
can hinder the passage from principles to rules, at the moment of apply-
ing them to specific conflicts. However, it is important to specify that 
the purpose of the article is to clarify another aspect of this applied eth-
ics, which speaks about the compatibility between ethical principles and 
their application from the procedural point of view. The theory of re-
sponsible citizenship can account for an adequate agency for the socio-
environmental issues. Admittedly, the “Environmental Citizenship” is 
surfacing as a new paradigm of the citizenship theory (Dobson 2003; 
Dobson & Bell 2006) in contrast with traditional citizenships (liberal 
and republican). 
This new type of citizenship is characterised by (i) being sustained by 
duties rather than by rights, for there are non-reciprocal duties of respect 
and care towards unknown human beings, remote both in time and space, 
as well as duties of care towards non-human entities, thus distancing itself 
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from the contractual model of citizenship which is based on reciprocal 
rights and duties; (ii) the actions of the private sphere (such as ways of 
consuming, travelling, working) have progressively more consequences 
in the public sphere; (iii) complementing the public virtue of justice with 
the private virtues of care and solidarity; (iv) overcoming membership in 
the territory of the nation-state, because the trend points to a postcosmo-
politan citizenship that makes us aware of both local and global member-
ship in planet Earth (Lecaros 2016).
One of the challenges faced by an agency theory, in the context of the 
global society, is its foundation over a paradigm of rationality different 
from the dominant, technocratic and economistic rationality. An alterna-
tive to this dominant rationality is ecological rationality. When “the 
value ‘long-term integrity of ecosystems and the biosphere’ (and the 
values related to it) are placed ahead of economic, legal, epistemic, military 
values, etc., and we perform our reasoning and weighings in accordance 
with this hierarchy, then we will be operating within an ecological ra-
tionality” (Riechman, 2009: 50). We consider that the methodological 
proposal of this article can be addressed in future works following the 
axiological rationality (Echeverría, 2007) and the operational concept 
languages of valuation in socio-ecological conflicts (Martínez Alier, 2002).
4. MAKING ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS MORE PRACTICAL
One of the problems that EE faces is the lack of clear methods to ap-
ply the ethical principles of deliberation and resolution of environmental 
conflicts. That is why a methodology appropriate for the scheme of 
principles proposed has to be able to turn the strategic intermediate prin-
ciples into rules, with the purpose of defining their content and extent at 
the moment of applying them. 
The methodology also has to be able to determine the derivative prin-
ciples and justify the lexicographical order between the framework prin-
ciple, the derivative principles and the strategic intermediate principles. 
This order obeys to the level of abstraction and generality and the role 
played in the diagram of the first two levels of principles. The rules that 
contain the derivative principles are general and have to be specified 
through the strategic principles that are of an operational order. 
Specification, following Beauchamp and Childress (2013), is a process 
that reduces the indeterminacy of the principles and the general rules, 
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which allows us to obtain rules with concrete contents that are applica-
ble to specific situations. Specification does not aim at justifying the 
content of the principles, but at specifying their application scope: it is 
a continuous process that demands to maintain the relationship of con-
tent between the principle and the rules every time new specifications 
are made. 
The rules extracted from the strategic principles are classified as sub-
stantive rules (sustainability rules, precautionary rules and self-sufficien-
cy or austerity rules), procedural rules (precautionary rules and rules of 
ecological justice) and distributive rules (rules of compensation for eco-
logical and social damage and polluter-pays rules). Each one of these rules 
has to be applied bearing in mind the socio-economic, cultural, political 
and environmental conditions of the conflict. 
Likewise, these rules operate while being directed by meta-rules which 
establish criteria to weigh and balance conflicting rules, guaranteeing the 
coherence between the intermediate principles when they are applied, 
thus avoiding the resolution of cases in terms of a dilemma: (i) the meta-
rule of systematic assessment of the conflicted entities; (ii) the meta-rule 
of the temporal consideration of the decisions; (iii) the meta-rule of pri-
oritizing duties over rights. 
The weighing and balancing, according to Beauchamp and Childress 
(2013), is a process that consists in looking for reasons that uphold our 
convictions regarding the rules that need to prevail when there is conflict 
with other rules. The key in the process of rule weighing in the environ-
mental conflicts field is the legitimation of the reasons given to make one 
rule prevail over another. On this point, we have to bear in mind the 
epistemic biases that were stated in the second section. 
Finally, to limit the partiality and arbitrariness in the weighing and 
balancing process of the rules, our methodological proposal appeals to 
mechanisms that are used in specific methodologies such as the Environ-
mental Conflicts Resolutions (Susskind et al., 1999; Susskind et al., 
2002; Dukes et al., 2000; Moore 2003), and in methodological platforms 
such as E. Ostrom’s Institutional Analysis and Development Framework 
(1990, 2005), and M Callon’s Hybrid Forums (2009). Now we will 
refer briefly to the identification of some tools that can complement the 
processes of specification and weighing of rules in socio-environmental 
conflicts. 
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4.1  INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS AND DEVELOPMENT FRAMEWORK  
(E.OSTROM)
E. Ostrom’s institutional approach is suitable for self-organization and 
self-management of commons. The political scientist has developed, in 
Governing the Commons (1990) and Understanding Institutional Di-
versity (2005), the theoretical framework and the applied methods to 
address environmental issues in which commons are at stake. In very 
broad terms, Ostrom understands institutions as prescriptions that humans 
use to organize all forms of repetitive and structured interactions (for 
example, families, neighborhoods, markets, firms, sports leagues, church-
es, private associations, and governments at all scales). Within the Insti-
tutional Analysis and Development Framework, she distinguishes as an 
analytic key unit the action arenas (actions situations and participants), 
which are determined by exogenous variables (biophysical and material 
conditions; community attributes; rules) and by the self-organized inter-
actions and results (Ostrom, 2005, 13-15).
In Governing the Commons, Ostrom proposes design principles that 
are characteristic institutions where the common resources lasted for a 
long time. 1) Clearly defined boundaries: Individuals or households who 
have rights to withdraw resource units from the common-pool resources 
(CPR) must be clearly defined, as must be the boundaries of the CPR 
itself. 2) Congruence between appropriation and provision rules and lo-
cal conditions: appropriation rules restricting time, place, technology, 
and/or quantity of resource units are related to local conditions and to 
provision rules requiring labor, material, and/or money. 3) Collective-
choice arrangements: most individuals affected by the operational rules 
can participate in modifying those operational rules. 4) Monitoring: the 
ones in charge of monitoring the compliance of the agreements between 
the exploiters of the commons have to answer to the organization. 5) 
Graduated sanctions. 6) Conflict-resolution mechanisms: simplicity of 
access to the problem-solving mechanisms. 7) Minimal recognition of 
rights to organize: the ability to organize themselves in front of local and 
governmental powers. 8) Nested entities: the different activities surround-
ing the commons are organized in multiple layers of nested enterprises 
(Ostrom, 1990, 88-102).
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4.2 HYBRID FORUMS (M. CALLON)
One of the creators of the Actor-Network Theory, M.Callon alongside 
P. Lascoumes and Y. Barthe, proposed in Acting in an Uncertain World: 
An Essay on Technical Democracy (2009) a referential framework to 
think of the public controversies about techno-scientific issues in society 
and the challenges they represent for their actors and their processes, 
namely “concerned groups”, the traditional “secluded research” per-
formed by modern science, “delegative democracy” and its representation 
procedures, including markets as well. 
The core concept developed is the hybrid forums, with which they 
want to express the procedure through which we overcome the dichot-
omy between official forums composed by the science experts and the 
informal forums composed by the rest of the citizens. In the traditional 
model of involvement, the basic distinction is between the objective risks 
(evaluated, calculated and controlled by scientists) and subjective risks 
(fears and uncertainties experienced by the affected people). While main-
taining this division, people have to circulate from the subjective risk 
universe (irrational and overwhelmed, and sometimes violent) towards 
the objective risk (rational and controlled) and then it is considered pos-
sible to sit down to have a conversation and discuss, deliberate and make 
decisions (Callon et al., 2009, 13-36).
The thesis that Callon et al. uphold is that the citizens’ participation 
is a requisite for the construction of legitimacy of science in society. For 
that purpose, they propose uniting both forums (official and informal) 
through different participative and deliberative procedures (public debates, 
consensus conferences, citizen panels and jury) that allow us to transfer 
the competence from the observers (experts, scientists) to the actors (Cal-
lon et al., 2009, 153-189). This way, those procedures contribute to re-
direct us to an enriched democracy named “dialogic democracy” (Callon 
et al., 2009, 205). 
Through this model, the authors propose a redefinition of the “rep-
resentatives” and the “represented” in modern democracy, presenting 
hybrid forums as producers of citizenship and as a path towards the 
“democratization of democracy”. For Callon et al., the model of citizen 
involvement in science is an open dynamic one which, through contro-
versy, customizes the weave of the social, economic, politic, technical, 
scientific, cultural, performing (without standardization), in constant 
experimentation, of our world. This type of construction of our society 
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demands, in the end, some sort of “measured action”, which translates 
in not taking definitive actions and leaving options open, because some 
new sociopolitical and technical arrangements constantly contribute to a 
reconfiguration of our common world (Callon et al., 2009, 225-254). 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
The principlism in environmental ethics requires an adequate structure 
that keeps the proportions with nature and the characteristics of socio-
environmental conflicts. In this sense, the different aspects at stake (tech-
nical, economic, social, scientific, political, and ethical, amongst others) 
in this kind of conflicts lead to favoring a pluralistic structure of principles. 
That is why it is crucial to determine the way in which this principles 
relate to one another, particularly in the cases of collision or when there 
is a practical impossibility of fulfilling their content. This problem is 
solved using a methodology that limits and regulates the conditions of 
application of the principles.
The design we propose as a scheme of principles for EE is character-
ized by a three-level structure, not meaning a hierarchy of principles in 
terms of an “ultimate foundation” in a specific EE theory, be it anthro-
pocentric, biocentric or ecocentric. In this sense, our proposal, while 
following the Principlism’ model, would serve to build an mid-level 
principles’ theory that is compatible with anthropocentric and non-an-
thropocentric theories alongside with theories that have a socio-environ-
mental approach. The methodology appropriate for the scheme of 
principles proposed has to be able to turn the strategic intermediate 
principles into rules with the purpose of defining their content and extent 
at the moment of applying it.
A model of principlism in environmental ethics, following the model 
of Beauchamp and Childress, certainly needs to be adjusted to the require-
ments of the EE, particularly in what refers to the agency theory and the 
theory of values. In this article we have proposed to at least advance in 
one of the elements of a theory of environmental ethics: the methodo-
logical question. This task is necessary to address the discontinuity between 
the principles commonly accepted in socio-environmental issues and the 
guidelines or rules of application for specific cases of socio-environmental 
conflicts.
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